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Disagreement about the meaning of pragmatism has characterised it from its earliest years. Peirce hoped that his work would aid the natural sciences by clarifying the concepts scientists use in the course of their investigations. In contrast, James focused on the role pragmatism might play in all areas of human life, seeing it in particular as a way of reconciling science with religious belief. James was excited by what he saw as the radical potential of his philosophy, going so far as to express the hope that pragmatism might become a movement with consequences comparable in significance to those of the Protestant Reformation.(1) For his part, Peirce was sceptical of the radical aspirations of some pragmatists, and regarded versions such as that of James to have fallen away from the sober insights of his own position.
In 1908 Arthur Lovejoy was able to discriminate thirteen versions of pragmatism, and a century later its diversity appears considerably greater.(2) In the light of the number of philosophers who either identify as pragmatists or have been associated with pragmatism, it is natural that attempts have been made to take account of this diversity. These attempts often follow Peirce by contrasting his formulations of pragmatism with the apparent deficiencies of Jamesian and Deweyan varieties.(3) This is the approach adopted by Cheryl Misak. Misak draws on elements in Peirce’s work in order to develop what she describes as a desirably “modest” form of pragmatism.(4) This she sets against the problems of Jürgen Habermas’ Kantian pragmatism on the one hand, and of what she thinks the radicalism of writers such as Richard Rorty on the other.(5) She claims that pragmatists should have no truck with the aspiration to justify beliefs and practices by means of transcendental argument, yet at the same time thinks that we might draw upon the resources present within our social practices in order to move beyond the kind of ethnocentrism proposed by Rorty. Specifically, these practices are said to provide for a substantive account of truth. Misak rejects transcendental and metaphysical theories of truth, but also argues that if we inspect our practices we nevertheless find robust standards of truth and objectivity operating there. As she remarks, “The trail of the human serpent is over everything (to use James’ phrase), but (as James himself may or may not have seen) this does not toss us into a sea of arbitrariness, where there is no truth or where truth varies from person to person or culture to culture.”(6) 
In this paper I argue that Misak is unsuccessful in identifying a position which is modest in the sense she claims. I begin by examining her most important contribution to pragmatism, her reworking of Peirce’s account of truth into an understanding of truth as indefeasibility. Contrary to what Misak claims, I argue that the idea of indefeasibility does not take us further than the general pragmatist commitment to fallibilism and open-mindedness. I then suggest that Misak’s occasionally expressed willingness to side with Rorty’s wholehearted acceptance of contingency is the correct insight to take from pragmatism, and that it should not be thought threatening once it is seen that the apparent dangers of radical pragmatism are not in fact present. 

 
Misak’s account of truth as indefeasibility 

In The American Pragmatists and other important work Misak takes pragmatists to be in broad agreement in giving up on many of the assumptions of modern philosophy. Pragmatists accept that there is no bedrock upon which to anchor belief; they set aside “the idea that we might find a foundation for our principles of right belief and of right action in some infallible source – from God, from some special faculty of intuition, or from what is given to us with certainty by experience.” Once this step is taken, however, a danger threatens, which is that “the source for, and the status of, our judgements, theories, and principles is altogether human and therefore arbitrary.”(7) In Misak’s presentation, one of the advantages of pragmatism is that it enables us to embrace anti-foundationalism while at the same time avoiding this unfortunate consequence by drawing on the conceptual resources present within our social practices. 
Identifying such a position is not easy, however. If we accept that epistemic foundations are not available, Misak claims that we become tempted to make one of two errors. One is that, despite declaring for anti-foundationalism, we go on tacitly to re-introduce supposedly “neutral standards” in order to justify our practices.(8) Misak thinks this is the case with Jürgen Habermas’ Kantian pragmatism. Habermas is said to err by failing to take seriously the practices within which we find ourselves, but that had he done so, he would not feel the need to attempt to support those practices by reference to transcendentalism. In contrast, some of those who successfully reject “neutral standards” are said by Misak to commit their own error, recoiling from the absence of such standards to claim that there are “no-standards-at-all.”(9) While she believes Rorty correct to argue that neutral standards are not available, Misak takes him to have gone on mistakenly to “leav[e] only parochial practice.”(10) He is said to move so far from neutral standards that he gives up on the very idea that concepts such as truth and objectivity might play a role in our lives. 
Let’s examine more closely Misak’s attempt to locate her modest form of pragmatism between “neutral standards and no-standards-at-all.”(11) Misak is clear that the category of “neutral standards” is empty, because any standards will be those of particular social practices. To this extent she is in agreement with Rorty’s assessment of writers such as Habermas. She takes herself to differ from Rorty though because, unlike him, she refuses to give up on the very idea of standards. However, the difficulty with her presentation on this point is that the category of “no-standards-at-all” is equally unavailable; in contrast to what Misak implies, there will always be some standards in operation. Standards cannot be neutral because they are worked up within particular social practices but, precisely for this reason, they constrain the members of those same practices. One of the lessons of pragmatism is that once humans begin to cooperate with one another to pursue their goals, then standards of behaviour, of judgments of propriety, of right and wrong, naturally follow. In the case of the natural sciences, standards include testing hypotheses through experiment; in historical research they entail consulting archives; in the law, judgements are made with reference to statute law and precedent. And importantly for Misak’s attempt to identify a distinct, modest pragmatism, this is a point on which Rorty is clear. Rorty notes for instance that “[i]n poker, you know you’ve won if you’re dealt an ace-high straight flush. In the laboratory, a hypothesis may be discredited if the litmus paper turns blue, or the mercury fails to come up to a certain level.”(12) None of these standards is neutral in the sense of existing independently of every particular social practice, and yet they clearly are standards, giving shape to practices the members of which utilise in the course of their activities. 
Misak surely knows this, and we must I think regard her claim that radical pragmatists acknowledge “no-standards-at-all” to be misleading. I take it that her real concern, the one which leads her to distinguish modest pragmatism from supposedly more radical varieties, is that the latter deny any means of judging the value of different standards. Rorty favours some standards – of free and open inquiry, liberal democracy, and so on – but as Misak sees it he has deprived himself of the means by which he might explain and argue for them. As she puts it, all that Rorty is able to say is “that the neo-Nazi believes one contingent, cultural-laden theory and we believe another.”(13) 
How has Rorty ended up in this unfortunate situation? According to Misak, the answer lies in his impoverished understanding of truth. She shares Rorty’s criticisms of the correspondence theory of truth, noting that it precludes the possibility that political and moral propositions might be true. More positively, she agrees with him that the concept of truth must be understood in terms of the role it plays within social practice. However, Misak thinks that while there is less to say about truth than has typically been supposed, there remains more than a radical such as Rorty recognises. Rorty claims that there is no point in maintaining that truth is a goal of inquiry because, in practice, it results in no difference in behaviour to that of attempting to secure justification.(14) In contrast, Misak argues that it is important to view truth as distinct from justification because doing so means that we do not have to rest content simply with agreement among conversational peers. 
	To explain Misak’s argument, it is helpful to consider exactly where she thinks Rorty goes wrong. Rorty’s claim is that if inquirers set themselves the goal of securing truth, in practice they can do no more than secure justification; if they have successfully justified a belief by persuading relevant others in the light of the available reasons and evidence, they have done all that they can or properly need do. Misak argues that this is dangerously ethnocentric, requiring only that we attend to the reasons for belief offered by the members of whatever social practice to which we happen to belong. In response, we can ask what is to stop Rorty, or any other radical, from seeking out new evidence or argument? After all, Rorty has spoken at length about the importance of imagination as the means to extend the scope of our community (the community of “we”) as widely as possible; his “ideally liberal society” is ideal precisely because it is open to encounters between different people and vocabularies.(15) Misak’s claim, however, is that while he might say this, without a robust conception of truth Rorty cannot explain why we ought to be open to such encounters: “the Rortian pragmatist cannot help himself to the idea that we should try to take all cultures into account.”(16) It is against this failure that Misak sets out an account of truth which aims to show why we are committed to attending to reasons irrespective of where they might come from.
She does so by drawing on elements of an argument found in Peirce’s writings. Peirce is often understood to present an account of truth in which it is identified as what would be reached at the “end of inquiry.” Critics have argued that the notion of the end of inquiry is empty, for the reason that we could never know that we have reached it; Rorty agrees with Michael Williams when he says that “we have no idea what it would be for a theory to be ideally complete and comprehensive ... or of what it would be for inquiry to have an end.”(17) Misak agrees with this objection. But she does so while noting that the idea of the end of inquiry is not the only understanding of Peirce’s position, and in her work offers an alternative. As she puts it, 

a better characterisation is that a true belief is one that would withstand doubt, were we to inquire as far as we fruitfully could on the matter. A true belief is such that, no matter how much further we were to investigate and debate, that belief would not be overturned by recalcitrant experience and argument.(18) 

Misak minimalises one formulation of Peirce’s position (truth is what would be reached at the fated end of inquiry) and advocates another (a true belief would be indefeasible). This has the advantage of avoiding the problems found in Peirce. In her reformulation, truth as indefeasibility provides not a goal at which to aim but rather a method by which inquiry ought to be conducted. A commitment to truth as indefeasibility requires that inquirers not limit themselves to their conversational partners but address reasons and arguments no matter where they come from for as long as it is productive to do so. As she puts it, “a methodological requirement falls out of the idea that a true belief would be the best belief, were inquiry to be pursued as far as it could fruitfully go. That methodological principle is that the experience of others must be taken seriously.”(19) This requirement is said to enable us to avoid the “sea of arbitrariness” in which truth varies from person to person or culture to culture, because it means that truth is a matter not of agreement within particular communities but is rather that which can defeat challenges from wherever they might emerge. 
The methodological requirement is held to produce in inquirers what Misak describes as “an enhanced willingness to seek out and take seriously new evidence and argument.” She explains: “The Peircean inquirer aims at getting beliefs that would stand up to whatever evidence and argument could come their way, hence it is only rational to expose beliefs to all the available evidence and argument to see if they meet interim bar.”(20) This is problematic, however. The methodological requirement that is said to follow from the idea of truth as indefeasibility is contentious, requiring that inquirers regard their beliefs as provisional and forever open to amendment or refutation. Many people do not regard their views in this way; they take themselves to be in possession of the truth here and now and are untroubled by those who present challenges to them.(21) To be sure, believing that one knows the truth is distinct from actually possessing it. But what Misak’s argument needs is a reason to offer those people who think they possess truth to open themselves up to the possibility that they might be mistaken in the way described by truth as indefeasibility. 
Misak is clear about the kind of reason that will not work. Habermas asserts that inquirers are committed to deliberation and discussion simply by virtue of their being agents, but Misak notes that this is implausible.(22) In contrast, her claim is that only those who are committed to truth must deliberate.(23) But distinguishing herself from Habermas in this way does not dispose of the difficulty in her own position. For one can take oneself to be committed to truth and yet decline to think oneself under a methodological requirement to take seriously the views of others. One might regard the persistence of people who take a different position on some matter not to be an invitation to engage with their reasons and arguments but simply as a sign of their error. Significantly for Misak’s Peircean argument, this is illustrated by Peirce’s ideal community of inquiry, that of natural science. Although internally democratic, natural scientists do not engage with viewpoints irrespective of who it is who puts them forward; there are very stringent controls on access, and only a relatively few highly trained experts are taken seriously as participants in investigation.(24)
Natural science illustrates that even the most open community does not indiscriminately attend to the views of just anyone; all communities have criteria which must be met in order to qualify as a participant in good standing. At one point in Truth, Politics, Morality Misak acknowledges this, writing that the position she proposes does not commit us to talk to everyone. For her, the criterion which determines whether or not one should be listened to is openness to truth, with those who can legitimately be ignored being people unconcerned with it. As an illustration, Misak cites followers of the Nazi jurist Carl Schmitt, whose lack of interest in truth is said to be evidenced in their not concerning themselves with the ideas and arguments of certain groups of people. The Schmittian’s refusal to acknowledge the methodological requirement to give serious attention to the views of those groups means that such a person excludes her or himself from being taken seriously in turn: “[t]he Schmittian who refuses to take seriously the experience of the other introduces one kind of situation in which we need not talk and we need not deliberate.”(25) Qualifying the Peircean methodological requirement in this way brings Misak’s position in line with the practice of actual communities of inquiry. There is though something ironic that an argument that seeks to show why we ought to open ourselves to arguments from whichever direction they might come moves so quickly to debar some from serious attention.(26) 
Lying behind the difficulties that I have identified with the notion of truth as indefeasibility and the methodological requirement that is said to follow from it is a more general tendency on Misak’s part to overstate the role of truth in motivating inquirers to be open to new perspectives. In her view, nationalists and other bigots should be criticised for their failure to make good on their commitment to truth (as indefeasibility) because they exclude the views of certain groups from consideration: “the argument against racists and nationalists is that their interest in truth speaks against their racism and nationalism.”(27) But it seems to me that the argument against such people is that they are cruel, and cause harm for morally irrelevant reasons. Here I think Rorty has the more persuasive position. His claim, which chimes for example with that made by many feminist writers, is that imagination and sympathy are the central moral virtues. Moral progress on this account should be thought of as a process of re-weaving one’s self, taking account of things one had previously not noticed and coming to attend to the ways in which different people have been made to suffer.(28) In contrast, Misak’s focus on truth is overstated, leading her to make somewhat inflated claims. She proposes for instance that “[i]f the Schmittian claims to have beliefs or claims to aim at the truth, then one can criticise him on the grounds that he has adopted a method of inquiry that is highly unlikely to reach the truth.”(29) These might be elements of the grounds on which we would wish to criticise such as person, but much more important are objections to the cruelties that she or he would inflict.   


Pragmatism and the contingency of reasons 

If I am right, Misak does not present anything more substantial than does Rorty for why inquirers ought to be open to encounters with people beyond the members of their particular community: Rorty takes imagination and curiosity to be sufficient to motivate such encounters, and the idea of truth as indefeasibility does not furnish an additional reason to welcome them. I want now to consider further Misak’s reasons for wanting to distance herself from radical pragmatists. 
These reasons centre around Misak’s concern that radical pragmatists leave us with nothing to say in order to defend our convictions. This concern emerges most clearly in her important account of a deliberative form of democracy. This account is motivated by her understanding of a deficiency in the work of many contemporary political theorists. Misak diagnoses in writers such as John Rawls what she describes as “a failure to offer a non-circular or non-question-begging justification of the view that we ought to arrange moral and political decision-making around open and free debate with agreement as its aim.”(30) The failure to provide such a justification is said not merely to be a narrowly philosophical matter, but one which has damaging consequences for society. For without a non-question-begging justification of free and open debate, Misak thinks there nothing that can be said to counter intolerance and violence: “the absence of a universal basis of adjudication has too often been intolerance, an intolerance which has sometimes culminated in genocide.”(31) 
In her work Misak seeks to provide a non-question-begging justification of free and open debate by arguing that the epistemic norms of giving and asking for reasons that are central to her Peircean conception of truth carry over into all areas of life, including politics; as she puts it, “deliberative democracy in political philosophy is the right view, because deliberative democracy in epistemology is the right view.”(32) In politics, insofar as citizens wish to hold true beliefs, they must address the reasons of others. As we have seen, this means that truth-seekers are implicitly committed to deliberation even if they take themselves to be opposed to it: “any opponent is committed to having her beliefs governed by reasons, so any opponent is committed, whether he acknowledges it or not, to debate and deliberation.”(33) 
This account of deliberative democracy raises several questions; for example, of the extent to which political life is analogous to intellectual inquiry.(34) The one I want to take up is how far pragmatists should be interested in securing a non-question-begging justification of democracy (or, indeed, of anything else). For this seems to conflict with the emphasis on fallibilism -- the view that any of our beliefs are potentially open to revision -- that is central to the pragmatist tradition.
On this point, an ambiguity can I think be seen in Misak’s writings. In criticism of Habermas, she sounds like Rorty when she writes that we must set aside “all of that ‘necessarily’ or ‘non-contingent’ talk.”(35) Yet when examining Rorty’s position, contingency is identified as the problem: Misak interprets him as saying that any reasons we might offer “are merely historically conditioned reasons, no different in status or worth from the neo-Nazi’s reasons based on inequality and hatred of those who are foreign.”(36) These claims are in tension: Misak’s dismissive view of “merely historically contingent reasons” implies the existence of reasons which escape contingency, but that is to fall in with the kind of “non-contingent talk” that she elsewhere takes to conflict with pragmatism and accordingly dismisses. That is to say, two very different ideas can be seen to inform modest pragmatism, and my suggestion is that Misak must choose between them. Misak can assert the existence of reasons which are not historically contingent, but doing so will return to the “neutral standards” that she recognises are incompatible with pragmatism and which she argues are unavailable when Habermas claims to have found them. Alternatively, she can accept that reasons bind us contingently, and that this entails giving up the idea of identifying a non-question-begging justification of democracy. 
Misak’s work contains passages which support both positions, the result I think of sympathy with the radical pragmatist appreciation of contingency but unwillingness wholly to accept its consequences. However, her fears might be assuaged if we see that her understanding of the consequences of radical pragmatism is inaccurate. As we have seen, she thinks that endorsing radical pragmatism entails that we will have no good reason to offer when arguing with the bigot or the fanatic. But this is to conflate two different claims: there is no such thing as a reason that escapes history and contingency, but what takes the sting out of this is the thought that the contingent nature of reason-giving does not preclude evaluating and arguing for beliefs. This point is seen by Rorty when he writes, “I do not know how to ‘justify’ or ‘defend’ social democracy … in a large philosophical way (as opposed to going over the nitty-gritty advantages and disadvantages of the alternatives [critics of democracy] propose).”(37) Although large philosophical justifications are unavailable, we can seek to justify our beliefs and convictions by arguing for their concrete advantages. Rorty suggests that the best way to do so is through invidious comparison: “the justification of liberal society [is] simply … a matter of historical comparisons with other attempts at social organization – those of the past and those envisaged by utopians.”(38) It counts in favour of this approach that it is consistent with the practice of many successful social movements. Feminism and the Civil Rights Movement had and have their effect by making society aware of the cruelty meted out to large numbers of people, and by imagining a world in which it played no part.  
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